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The report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America (hereafter referred to as the Kissinger Report) called 
for a major u.s. economic commitment to Central America. The 
report projected $24 billion in external financing needs now 
through 1990, for the six nations analyzed, of which $12 billion 
is expected to be supplied by multilateral sources and most of 
the remainder by the u.s. The Commission recommended that the 
u.s. commit $8 billion in assistance for a five-year period 
beginning 1985. This amount represents roughly doubling u.s. 
economic assistance from 1983 levels, and is over $1,000 per 
capita for the 23 million people in the six countries.! This 
large amount of assistance could make a significant impact on 
these countries if used productively. 
This paper summarizes the highlights of the Report with 
emphasis on agriculture since, as Adams has pointed out, six out 
of ten people live in rural areas in central America, nearly a 
1 The Report covers six countries which are considered to be in 
crisis and which are expected to be benefitted by the proposed 
expansion in u.s. assistance. Disagreements with Nicaragua, 
however, may prevent that country from receiving the proposed 
aid. The six countries with their projected external financing 
needs in millions of dollars are: Costa Rica - $5.1, El 
salvador - $5.5, Guatemala - $4.5, Honduras - $2.3, Panama -
$3.2, and Nicaragua - $3.4. 
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quarter of the gross domestic product ~omes from agriculture, and 
farm products make up almost 70 percent of the value of exports. 
Thus, for foreign assistance to make a significant impact on the 
majority of the population, it must directly or indirectly 
influence the agricultural sector. 
pverall Strategy 
A central issue for the Commission concerned the nature of 
the challenge currently faced in the region, the origin of the 
problems and the overall strategy for solution. u.s. perceptions 
about the causes of the region's turmoil are mixed and the 
official u.s. view has changed from the Democratic to the 
Republican administrations. The carter administration stressed 
the view that basic social and economic problems were the 
indigenous factors that prompted recent social upheaval. The 
Reagan administration, however, has argued that foreign sub-
version is primarily to blame. Not surprisingly, the "Bipart-
isan" commission argued that the current crisis is a product of 
both indigenous and foreign factors and reported: 
Poverty, repression, inequity, all were there, breeding 
fear and hate: stirring in a world recession created a 
potent witch's brew, while outside forces have intervened 
to exacerbate the area's troubles and to exploit its 
anguish. (p.l5). 
The Commission noted strong economic performance in the 
region from World war II through the mid-l970s. Regional gross 
domestic product increased at a rate of 5.3 percent per year in 
real terms between 1950 and 1978. However, the economic collapse 
beginning in the late 1970s, caused in part by world recession, 
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has resulted in declines in per capita income by 1983 ranging 
from 12 percent in Honduras to 38 percent in Nicaragua. 
BdHed on this nndlysls, the commjssion arg11ed that a doubJ~ 
challenge must be met. The overriding economic issue is poverty, 
slow growth and indebtedness, while the political challenges 
center on legitimacy of government where throughout the hemi-
sphere democracy is becoming the rule but a Soviet-Cuban thrust 
is emerging. The commission recommended financial aid, organi-
zational innovations, and political and military changes to meet 
these challenges. 
The Economic Program 
The Committee's basic economic conclusion is that by 1990 
per capita economic activity in the region will reach no more 
than three quarters of the 1980 level unless there is a sig-
nificant increase in foreign assistance, improved resource use 
and growth-oriented policies. Therefore, an emergency stabil-
ization program is proposed along with a medium- and long-term 
reconstruction and development program. 
The emergency program is made up of eight recommendations: 
1) The u.s. and the central American countries should initiate a 
comprehensive approach to economic development; 2) the private 
sector should be given the greatest possible involvement; 3) the 
u.s. should actively address the external debt problems; 4) the 
u.s. should immediately increase economic assistance (a supple-
mental $400 million request is proposed for fiscal 1984): 
5) expanded aid should be directed to labor intensive infra-
structure and housing; 6) new official trade credit guarantees 
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should provide emergency credit to the central American Market 
Fund (CACMF); and 8} the u.s. should join the central Ameiican 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). 
These emergency measures are admittedly "an effort to buy 
time to permit the central American nations and their friends to 
build a broader structure of cooperation for the longer future!! 
(p.50). The medium-term objectives (which are consistent with 
u.s. interests) include elimination of the climate of violence, 
development of democratic institutions and processes, development 
of strong and free economies, sharp improvement in social 
conditions of the poor, and substantially improved distribution 
of income and wealth. It is recommended that the u.s. contribute 
to long-term growth by 1) doubling financial assistance, 2) 
adopting multiple-year appropriations, 2) expanding economic 
assistance for democratic institutions and leadership training, 
4) reviewing its non-tariff barriers to imports from Central 
America, 5) encouraging other major trading countries to adopt 
duty-free trade to central America, 6) providing technical and 
financial support for export promotion, 7) encouraging the 
formation of a regional privately-owned venture capital company, 
8) expanding availability of OPIC insurance, 9) developing aid 
programs to nurture small businesses, and 10) supporting the 
development of a regional structure (the central American 
Development organization - CADO) to provide a continuous and 
coherent approach to regional development. 
The massive amount of financial assistance included in these 
recommendations is surprisingly inconsistent with the caribbean 
Basin Initiative announced just two years earlier. As Alexander 
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notes, the Initiative rejected a massive transfer of resources as 
necessary or even desirable in favor of a Reaganomics concept of 
the market economy establishing a firm foundation for long-term 
growth. The change in emphasis may be a reflection of the cool 
reception the CBI has received and the rising respectability of 
protectionism in the u.s. The commission's focus on the private 
sector is, of course, consistent with the Initiative and the 
directon of AID programs in the Reagan Administration. 
Accelerating Agricultural Development 
The Report's economic recommendations for agriculture are 
of special interest because of the sector's importance. Here the 
Report is surprisingly brief--only two pages. Although it is 
acknowledged that rural areas contain the majority of the poor 
and have the greatest potential for rapid growth (p. 57), the 
recommendations are few and the analysis is sketchy. Integrated 
rural development programs are encouraged which increase access 
to land and security of title, distribute land more equitably, 
provide credit supplies, avoid cheap food policies, and expand 
rural infrastructure, research and extension. The recommen-
dations for the u.s. are limited to 1) strengthening the finan-
cial underpinnings of programs to broaden land ownership, 
2) providing resources for credit and investment programs, and 
3) increasing support for cooperatives. 
By emphasizing secure access to land, the Commission 
recognized a major historical source of economic and political 
inequality which can be easily exploited by revolutionaries and 
contributes to the current crisis. Thus the Commission directs 
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u.s. attention toward long-term structural problems rather than 
just quick-fix supply-side economic solutions. 
The Report is flawed, however, because it contains no 
attempt to quantify important issues associated with these 
recommendations such as the amount of unused or under-utilized 
land available for redistribution, the extent and incidence of 
distortions in agricultural pricing and trade policies, the 
economic losses in agricultural production due to damaged or 
destroyed marketing, communications and transport facilities, the 
production potential that could be realized through improved 
research and extension, the comparative advantage of these 
countries in international trade,and the borrowing and repayment 
capacity of farmers and rural businesses. Furthermore, there is 
not even an illustrative breakdown of possible allocation of 
foreign assistance among sectors or individual projects. An 
appendix with materials prepared for the commission is promised 
for a later date. It may contain some of this information, but 
it is not now available to readers of the Report. The inescap-
able conclusion is that the Report gives cursory treatment to the 
crucial detai~s of its economic recommendations, and gives 
surprisingly little attention to agriculture--the sector that 
employs most of the people, has the greatest short-term pro-
duction potential and whose performance will have more impact 
than any other sector on the future economic and social welfare 
of these countries. 
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How could the commission derive such a specific statement of 
financial need, yet produce such a superficial report on the 
rationale for these resources and their allocation? Is it 
possible that the commission's economic analysis was as shallow 
as it appears? The answers to these questions require more 
knowledge than I have about the commission, but we can identify 
alternative explanations for the contents of the Report. 
one explanation is that the Commission did not receive 
enough economic information to conduct a more substantive 
analysis. This explanation is somewhat difficult to accept, 
however, because of the substantial effort made to collect 
information. The commission met with nearly 200 people in 
washington and with another 300 people in nine days of foreign 
travel, sent questionnaires to 170 selected outside experts, and 
received written material from 230 other individuals and groups. 
Presumably some of these persons were academics and representa-
tives of agencies, such as AID and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, that have conducted substantive analyses of the economic 
problems and the agricultural sectors in the six countries. 
Another possible explanation is that the Committee did not 
have the capacity, because of its composition and/or staff 
support, to conduct a more thorough economic analysis. Only one 
of the commission members--carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro--is an 
economist, and most of his professional work has been on general 
economics issues with little work on agricultural problems. 
A third explanation is that the Commission's mandate was 
largely political. President Reagan was obviously seeking 
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support for his Central American policy and hoped that by 
selecting a panel with such politically visible persons as Henry 
Kissinger, Henry Cisneros, Lane Kirkland, and Robert Strauss, and 
by obtaining a concensus report, that broader-based u.s. policy 
could be developed. The details of the recommendations and 
analysis are less important in this situation than is concensus 
over broad strategy and goals. The commission's task can be seen 
as reconciling competing views about the causes of the regional 
crisis and the appropriate u.s. response. 
A fourth explanation is that the commission members ini-
tially felt or became convinced during their deliberations that 
political and military issues were paramount. Thus a significant 
amount of the Report is devoted to analyzing regional security 
issues, past involvement of the u.s., Cuba, and the USSR in the 
Region, and the impact of the current crisis on u.s. interests. 
A final explanation is that the commission may have felt its 
appropriate role was to lay out broad economic goals and build 
support for a total foreign assistance package in congress while 
leaving the details of analysis and implementation to profes-
sionals in the state Department and AID. Although congress has 
tightened its control over the overall thrust of AID activities 
and the allocation of funds, individual country programs are 
thrashed out largely in the executive branch. 
symposium Objectives 
A major contribution of the commission was its rejection of 
simple explanations for the causes of the regional crisis and its 
attempt to link u.s. assistance to resolving long-term structural 
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economic problems. The superficiality of the Report's analysis 
and recommendations, however, raise serious issues which are the 
subject of this symposium. Reed Hertford will discuss the status 
of Central American agriculture as background to help evaluate 
the commission's approach to the sector. Wayne Nilsestuen will 
discuss current u.s. bilateral programs in central America and 
how they might be affected if the Commission's recommendations 
are adopted. Finally, Dale Adams will discuss possible disin-
centives for agricultural development that adoption of the recom-
mendations might create. 
Few definitive conclusions are expected from this session, 
but we hope to raise everyone's awareness about the com-
plexity of Central America's agricultural problems and the 
appropriate u.s. response. 
- 10 -
References 
Adams, Dale W, "Foreign Assistance, Economic Policies, and 
Agriculture in Central America." Paper presented at the 
Conference on Financial Crisis, Foreign Assistance, and 
Domestic Resource Mobilization in the caribbean Basin, The 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, April 30-May l, 1984. 
Alexander, Joseph, "The caribbean Initiative: An Unworkable 
Extension of Reaganomics." Paper presented at the Allied 
Social Science Meetings, New York, N.Y., December 28-30, 
1982. 
g~port of the National Bipartisan Commission on central America , 
Washington, D.C., January 10, 1984. 

